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Abstract
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a typical attack
technique that can exploit return addresses to repeatedly
abuse existing codes ending with return instructions. Most
of the current return address protecting mechanisms (also
known as the Backward-Edge Control-Flow Integrity) can
work only in limited threat models. For example, the at-
tacker cannot control the whole memory, or the attacker have
no knowledge of a secret key or random values.
This paper presents a novel, lightweight mechanism pro-
tecting return addresses, Zipper Stack, which hashes all re-
turn addresses by a chain structure. This innovative design
can defend against the most powerful attackers who have full
control over the program’s memory and even know the secret
key of the hash function. This threat model is stronger than
them in the relevant works. At the same time, it produces
very low performance overhead. We implemented Zipper
Stack by extending the RISC-V instruction set architecture
and the evaluation shows that the performance overhead of
Zipper Stack is only 1.86% (vs a Shadow Stack on the same
platform costs 2.36%). Additionally, the lightweight nature
of Zipper Stack makes it practicable for deployment with
minimal modifications on the system. We only need two
registers and a hash module, no need to make any changes
to the memory allocation and page attributes. Thus, we think
Zipper Stack is suitable for actual deployment.
1 Introduction
In the exploitation of memory corruption bugs, return ad-
dress is one of the most widely exploited vulnerable points.
On the one hand, code-reuse attacks (CRAs), such as ROP
[8] and ret2libc [33], are state-of-the-art attack techniques.
They perform malicious behaviours by chaining short se-
quences of instructions which end with a Return via cor-
rupted return addresses. These attacks require no code in-
jection so they could bypass non-executable memory protec-
tion. On the other hand, the most widely exploited memory
vulnerability, stack overflow, is also exploited by overwriting
the return address. Both CRAs and stack smashing attacks
rely on tampering with the return addresses.
In order to protect the return addresses, quite a few meth-
ods were presented, such as Stack Protector (also known as
Stack Canary) [11, 16, 46], Address Space Layout Random-
ization (ASLR) [39], Shadow Stacks [9, 36, 12, 30], Con-
trol Flow Integrity (CFI) [2, 3], and Cryptography-based CFI
[26, 31]. However, they have encountered various problems
in the actual deployment.
Stack Protector and ASLR rely on random values (cookies
or memory layout) that attackers cannot disclose. Both meth-
ods are used on deployment in practise. However if there
is a memory leak, both methods will fail [37]: the attacker
can overwrite with a same value to bypass the Stack Protec-
tor, and de-randomize the ASLR to bypass it. Some works
have proved that they can be stably bypassed in some cir-
cumstances [34, 25, 20], such as BROP [6]. Even if there’s
no information leaking, some approaches could still bypass
ASLR and perform CRAs [32].
Shadow Stack is a direct mechanism which records all re-
turn addresses in a protected stack and checks them when
returns occur. It has been developed via both compiler-based
and instrumentation-based approaches [13, 12]. In recent
years, commercial hardware support has also emerged [21].
But Shadow Stack relies heavily on the absolute security of
the protected memory area, which is difficult to guarantee
in actual deployment. Some designs of Shadow Stack uti-
lize the ASLR to protect the Shadow Stack, however, they
cannot thwart the attacks contains any information disclo-
sure [12]. Since most methods that bypass ASLR [34, 25]
are effective against this type of defense. Other designs use
page attributes to protect the Shadow Stack, for instance,
CET [21]. However, defenses that rely on page attributes,
such as NX (no-execute bit), have been bypassed by various
technologies in actual deployment [22]: a single corrupted
code pointer to the function in the library (via a JOP/COOP
attack) may change the page attribute and disable the pro-
tection. Some historical attacks have also proved the page
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attributes are noneffective under certain circumstances [41].
In light of these findings, we think that mechanisms which
do not rely on memory security are more reliable and imper-
ative.
Cryptography-based protection mechanisms have also
been proposed, which are based on hash authentication.
These methods hash the return addresses and authenticate
them before returns [26, 49, 31]. These mechanisms do not
rely on memory security since the attacker cannot generate
new correct hashes without the secret key. But they are fac-
ing other problems: replay attacks (which reuse the exist-
ing code pointers and the hash of them), high performance
overhead and security of keys. A simple defence using hash
cannot thwart the replay attacks, so some designs introduces
extra complexity to avoid the problem (such as add a nonce
or add stack pointer into the hash input), and the effect is not
ideal. Besides, the performance overhead of these methods
is also not negligible, since they use a cryptographic hash
and then save the result into memory. Both hash calculations
and memory accesses consume a lot of cycles in CPU. The
security of the secret key is also a challenge, since once the
secret key was leaked, the whole defend became noneffec-
tive. Theses works assume that there is no hardware attack
or secret leak from kernel. In the real world, however, the
secret key can be leaked by a side channel attack or an attack
on context switching in kernel. Therefore, we should go fur-
ther over these assumptions, and develop countermeasures
resisting secret leak.
In this paper, we propose a concise and novel method
to protect return addresses, Zipper Stack, which uses a
lightweight hashing algorithm to protect the return addresses
and the hashes of return addresses together. In the design of
Zipper Stack, all addresses and hash values are in a chain.
The newest hash value is generated by hashing the newest
return address and the previous hash value. The previous
hash value was generated by hashing the return address and
hash value prior to the previous one, as the Figure 1 shows.
So the newest hash value is calculated from all the former
return addresses in the stack, although it is just generated by
computing the newest address and the previous hash value.
Zipper Stack minimizes the amount of state requiring direct
protection: only the newest hash value needs to be protected
from tampering. Without tampering the newest hash value,
an attacker cannot tamper with any return address because
he cannot tamper the whole chain and keep the relation.
Zipper Stack avoid the problems of Shadow Stack and
Cryptography-based protection mechanisms. Compared
with Shadow Stack, it does not rely on the security of any
memory area. Consequently, the attacks that modify both
the shadow stack and main stack cannot work in Zipper
Stack: Zipper Stack uses the hash to verify the return ad-
dress, not the copy. It also reduces the complexity of the de-
sign. Compared with other cryptography-based mechanisms,
Zipper Stack can resist against replay attacks itself (because
Figure 1. Core of Zipper Stack
the same return address will not share the same hash value),
and will not fail even if the secret key was leaked (because
the newest hash cannot be tampered with, even if the attacker
knows the secret key, he still needs to find hash collision for
each corrupt return address, see Section V). In terms of ef-
ficiency, Zipper Stack performs even better. Our design is
more suitable for parallel processing in the CPU pipeline,
which avoids most performance overhead caused by the hash
calculation and memory access. The performance overhead
of Zipper Stack with hardware support based on Rocket Core
[43] (RISC-V CPU [44]) is only 1.86% based on our experi-
ments (versus a hardware based Shadow Stack costs 2.36%).
Therefore, we think that Zipper Stack is a better alternative
to Shadow Stack.
The neat design of Zipper Stack solved three challenges:
First, it avoided the significant runtime overhead that most
cryptography-based mechanisms suffer. Since the newest
hash could be updated in parallel with normal execution.
In our hardware implementation, most instructions that con-
tain a hash take only one cycle (See Section 6). Second,
it utilized the LIFO order of return addresses to minimize
the amount of state requiring direct protection. In general,
a trust root authenticating all the data could help us to de-
fend against replay attacks or attacks that contain secret key
leaks (which most current return address protection method
cannot). While in Zipper Stack, the authentication uses the
newest hash, at the same time, the hash is a dynamic trust
root itself. So it gets better security without extra overhead.
Third, previous methods protect each return address sepa-
rately, so any one could be attacked. Zipper Stack, however,
could connect all the return addresses together, leverage the
prior information to increase the bar for attackers.
In order to demonstrate the design and evaluate the per-
formance, we implement Zipper Stack in three deployments
corresponding to three situations: a) Hardware approach,
which is suitable when hardware support of Zipper Stack is
available. b) Customized compiler approach, which is suit-
able when hardware support is not available but we can re-
compile the programs. c) Customized ISA approach, which
is suitable when we cannot recompile the programs but we
can alter the function of CALL/RET instructions. Ideally,
hardware approach is best - it costs lowest runtime over-
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head. So we mainly discuss this approach in this paper. The
other two approaches, however, are suitable in some compro-
mised situation. In hardware approach ,we instantiated Zip-
per Stack with a customized Rocket Core (a RISC-V CPU)
on the Xilinx Zynq VC707 evaluation board (and a hard-
ware based Shadow Stack as a comparison). In customized
compiler approach, we implemented Zipper Stack in LLVM.
In customized ISA approach, we use Qemu to simulate the
modified ISA.
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes the follow-
ing contributions:
1. Design: We present a novel, concise, efficient return
address protection mechanism, called Zipper Stack,
which could protect return addresses against the attack-
ers have full control of all the memory and know the
secret keys, with no significant runtime overhead. Con-
sequently, we analyze the security of our mechanism.
2. Implementation: To demonstrate the benefits of Zip-
per Stack, we implemented Zipper Stack on FPGA
board, and a hardware-based Shadow Stack as a com-
parison. In order to demonstrate the potential of Zipper
Stack to be further developed, we also implemented it
in LLVM and Qemu.
3. Evaluation: We quantitatively evaluated the runtime
performance overhead of Zipper Stack, which is better
than existing mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we introduce the background. In Section
3, we define our threat model. In Section 4, we introduce
Zipper Stack in details. Then we discuss the security and
performance overhead in Section 5. We introduce our imple-
mentations and evaluate them in Section 6 and Section 7.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 ROP attacks
Return Oriented Programming (ROP) [33, 8] is the major
form of code reuse attacks. ROP makes use of existing code
snippets ending with return instructions called gadgets to
perform malicious acts. In ROP attacks, the attackers link
different gadgets by tampering with a series of return ad-
dresses. An attack is usually made up of multiple gadgets.
At the end of each gadget, a return instruction links the next
gadget via the next address in the stack. The defenses against
ROP mainly prevent return instructions from using corrupted
return addresses, or randomize the layout of the codes.
2.2 Shadow Stack and SafeStack
Shadow Stack is a typical technique to protect return ad-
dresses. Shadow Stack saves the return addresses in a sep-
arated memory area, and checks the return addresses in
the main stack when returns. It has been developed in
both compiler-based and instrumentation-based approaches
[9, 36, 12, 30, 28, 27, 15, 29]. SafeStack [23] is a simi-
lar way, which moves all the return addresses into a sepa-
rated stack instead of backs up the return addresses. SafeS-
tack is now implemented in LLVM as a component of CPI
[40]. Both methods are used as a part of the backward-edge
Control-Flow Integrity and provides satisfactory security in
certain threat model. These techniques need extra memory
space to store copies of the return addresses, obviously, this
area needs to be protected. In some implementations it de-
pends on ASLR or modifications on the page attributes.
A separated stack mainly brings about two problems: One
problem is that, the shadow stack is protected separately,
which means that additional memory allocations are neces-
sary and, in addition, special designs are required to protect
it. Another problem is that, it requires the shadow stack to
be perfectly protected, which is impractical. As the structure
of shadow stack is simply the copies of return addresses, it
is very fragile once the attacker is able to modify its memory
area. For example, in Intel CET, the protection of shadow
stack is provided by a new page attribute. But the similar
approach in DEP is easily bypassed by a variety of meth-
ods modifying the page attribute in real-world attacks [22].
ASLR is also bypassed in real-world attacks which other
implementations rely on. Some mechanisms use other data
structure like hash tree (Merkle tree) to protect the shadow
stack with a small trusted source (the root of the tree), e.g.
[29]. However, the structure need several hash calculations
to reach the trusted source, which costs more overhead.
In Zipper Stack, both the problems are solved: even if the
attacker has full control over the program’s memory, he is
not able to perform ROP attacks, since Zipper Stack do not
rely on the security of any memory area; and Zipper Stack
does not require a separated stack, and requires fewer modi-
fications on compilers, OS, or hardware.
2.3 CFI
Control Flow Integrity (CFI), which first introduced by
Abadi et. al. [2, 3], has been recognized as an important low-
level security property. In CFI, runtime checks are added to
enforce that jumps and calls/rets land only to valid locations
that have been determined ahead of execution. CFI can pro-
tect from code reuse attacks (CRAs). Most of these CFI ap-
proaches rely on information analyzed from assembly codes
or higher level, up to source code [7, 48, 42, 45].
The security and performance overhead of different im-
plementations differ. Fine-grained CFI approaches will in-
troduce significant overhead. However coarse-grained CFI
has lower performance overhead but enforces weaker restric-
tions, which is not secure enough. In addition, Control-
Flow Graphs (CFGs), which fine-grained CFI bases on, are
constructed by analyzing either the disassembled binary or
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source code. CFG cannot be both sound and complete, so
even if efficiency losses are not mainly considered, CFI is
not a panacea for code reuse attacks [14]. Due to the above
reasons, CFI is not widely deployed on real systems now.
2.4 Crypto-based CFI
In order to optimize the CFI, some implementations also in-
troduce cryptography methods to solve problems such as in-
accurate static analysis: CCFI [26], RAGuard [49]. Most of
these methods are based on hash: the protected key point-
ers including return addresses are hashed and checked be-
fore use. But all of these methods rely heavily on secrets
(hash challenges or keys). In order to ensure the confiden-
tiality of the secrets, they must use a high-secure algorithm,
which in turn, brings tremendous performance overhead. In
Zipper Stack, the performance is much lower than previous
methods. Another problem of these mechanisms is about
replay attacks, the attackers can perform replay attacks by
reusing the existing values in the memory. Some implemen-
tations add stack pointer such as RBP into the input of the
hash function to avoid the problem, but it’s not ideal. Fortu-
nately, Zipper Stack can naturally resist replay attacks. Be-
sides, in these mechanisms, once the secret was figured out
or violently cracked, the building of attacks becomes easy.
However, Zipper Stack increases the difficulty of counter-
feiting control flows: even if the attacker gets the secret, he
still needs to find enough hash collisions to bypass the veri-
fication.
2.5 Randomization
Randomization-based approaches have also been proposed
to mitigate code reuse attacks. Address Space Layout Ran-
domization (ASLR) [39] and Stack Protector [11, 10](also
known as Stack Canary) are widely used among them.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) performs
by randomizing base addresses of code segments. In ROP
attacks, attackers have to know the address of each gadget to
launch the attack. Thus, ASLR seems effective in preventing
ROP attacks. However, like most approaches that rely on
randomization, ASLR can be bypassed by leveraging brute-
force attacks or information leakage attacks.
Stack Protector inserts a random value above the return ad-
dress. When stack overflows, this random value is changed,
thus a potential attack has been detected. But Stack Protector
can only work towards stack smashing attacks. In addition,
when an attacker can read the stack, it can be bypassed by
overwriting the random value with the same value.
3 Threat Model
In this paper we assume that a powerful attacker has the abil-
ity to read and overwrite arbitrary areas of memory. He tries
to perform ROP (or ret2lib) attacks. This situation is very
common - for example, a controllable pointer out of bounds
could help the attacker to acquire the capability. Reasonably,
the attacker cannot alter the value in the dedicated registers
(called Top and Key registers in our design), since these reg-
isters cannot be accessed by general instructions. The at-
tacker in our assumption is more powerful than all previous
works. The Shadow Stacks assume that the attackers can-
not locate or overwrite the shadow stack, which is part of the
memory. In our work, we do not need that assumption, which
means we could defend against more powerful attacks.
4 Design
In this section, we elaborate on the design of Zipper Stack in
detail. Here, we take the hardware approach as an example.
The design of other approaches is similar.
4.1 Overview
Figure 2. Overview of Zipper Stack
In hardware approach, we need hardware support and the
modification of memory layout.
Figure 2 shows the overview of the hardware in Zipper
Stack: Zipper Stack needs two dedicated registers and a hash
module in the CPU, and it requires no hardware modification
of the memory. The registers include the Top register holding
a hash value (Nh bits) and the Key register holding a secret
key (Ns bits). Both the registers should be initialized to ran-
dom numbers at the beginning of a process and they cannot
be read nor rewritten by attackers. The secret key will not
altered in the same process. Therefore, we temporarily ig-
nored this register for the sake of simplicity in the following.
Assuming that the width of return addresses is Na, the hash
module should perform a cryptographic hash function with
an input bit width of Na+Nh and an output bit width of
Nh. In addition, this hash function should include a random
challenge (Key register) to avoid becoming a fixed function.
We now turn to the memory layout of Zipper Stack. In
Zipper Stack, all return addresses are bound to a hash value,
as shown in Figure 3. The novelty is, the hash value is not
generated from the address bound with itself, but from the
previous return address with the hash value bound with that
address. This connection keeps all return addresses and hash
values in a chain. In order to maintain the structure, the top
one, namely the last return address pushed into the stack, is
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Figure 3. Layout in Zipper Stack: The dotted rectangles in the
figure indicate the input of the hash function, and the solid lines
indicate the storage location of the hash output.
hashed together with the previous hash and the output hash
value is saved into the Top register; while the bottom one,
i.e. the first return address pushed into the stack, is bound
to a random number (exactly the initial value of Top register
when the program begins).
4.2 Operations
Next, we describe how Zipper Stack works with return ad-
dresses in the runtime, i.e., how to handle the Call instruc-
tions and the Return instructions. As Figure 4 shows.
Call: In general, the Call instructions perform two oper-
ations. First, push the address of the next instruction into
stack. Then, set the PC to the call destination. While in Zip-
per Stack, the Call instructions become slightly more com-
plicated and need three steps:
1. Push the Top register along with the return address into
main stack;
2. Hash the Top register along with the return address into
a new hash value and save the new value into the Top
register;
3. Set the PC to the call destination.
Return: In general, the Return instructions also perform
two operations. First, pop the return address from the stack;
second, set the PC to this address. Correspondingly, in Zip-
per Stack, Returns also become a little more complicated,
including four steps.
1. Pop the return address and the previous hash value from
the main stack, and use the same hash function before
to hash them into a new hash value for check;
Figure 4. The stack layout before/after a call/return. Previous Hash
is hashed from previous return address and the hash with that return
address. SP stands for stack pointer.
2. Check whether this new hash value is equal to the cur-
rent hash value in the Top register. If not, raise an ex-
ception (which means an attack).
3. Save the hash value poped from the stack into the Top
register.
4. Set the PC to the return address poped from the stack.
Figure 4 shows the process of CALL and RET in Zipper
Stack. We omit the normal operations about the PC and re-
turn addresses.
The core idea of Zipper Stack is to use a chain structure to
link all return addresses together. Based on this structure, we
only need to focus on the protection and verification of the
top of the chain instead of protecting the entire structure. Just
like a zipper, only the slider is active, and when the zipper
is pulled up, the following structure automatically bites up.
Obviously, protecting a hash value from tampering is much
easier than protecting a series of hash values from tampering:
Adding a special register in the CPU is enough, and there is
no need to protect a special memory area.
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Table 1: Security Comparison
Adversary Stack Protector ASLR Shadow Stack Hash&Check Encrypt&Decrypt Zipper Stack
Stack Overflow safe safe safe safe safe safe
Arbitrary Write unsafe safe safe safe safe safe
Memory Leak & Arbitrary Write unsafe unsafe unsafe safe safe safe
Secret Leak & Arbitrary Write N/A N/A N/A unsafe unsafe safe
Replay Attack unsafe unsafe N/A unsafe unsafe safe
Brute-force Attempts N/A N/A N/A 2Ns−1 2Ns−1 2Ns−1 +N ∗2Nh−1 *
*: Under a probability of 1− (1−1/e)N , the valid hash collision of a certain attack does not exist.
N: The number of gadgets in an attack; Nh: Bit width of hash value/ciphertext; Ns: Bit width of secret.
The Brute-force attack already contains the memory leak, so the ALSR is noneffective and not considered.
4.3 Setjump/Longjump and C++ Exceptions
In most cases, the return addresses are used in a LIFO order
(last in, first out). But there are exceptions, such as setjump/-
longjump and C++ exceptions. Consequently, most mecha-
nisms protecting return addresses suffer from the Setjump/-
Longjump and C++ Exceptions, some papers even think the
block-chaining like algorithm cannot work with exceptional
control-flows [15]. However, Zipper Stack can accommo-
date both Setjump/Longjump and C++ Exceptions. Both
Setjump/Longjump and C++ Exceptions mainly save and re-
store the context between different functions. The main task
of them is stack unwind. So we are only concerned with the
Top register and the return addresses, since other operations
in the stack unwinding have nothing to do with us.
The return addresses in the stack will not encounter any
problem, since Zipper Stack does not alter either the value
nor the position of return addresses. The only problem is
how to restore the Top register. The solution is quite simple:
backup the Top register just like backup the stack pointer
or other registers (in Setjump/Longjump save them in the
jump buffer, similar in C++ Exceptions). When we need to
Longjump or handle an exception, restore the Top register
just as restoring other registers. The chain structure will re-
main tight. However, the jump buffer is in the memory, so
this solution exposes the Top register (since the attacker is
able to write on arbitrary areas of memory) and leaves an
opportunity to overwrite the Top register. So additional pro-
tection is a must. There are several ways to fix it:
1. Hash the Top register and other values in the jump
buffer into a checksum and add it into the jump buffer.
Check it when long jump.
2. Similar to the first one, encrypt the Top register and
other values in the jump buffer and decrypt them when
long jump.
3. In C++ exceptions, the exception structures are in a
linked list, so we can use another Zipper-Stack-like
structure to protect all the exception structures. This
requires extra Top and Key registers.
4. Design a new system call to save the values in some-
where out of the process memory space (in kernel).
In the first and second way, we need to protect other values
along with Top register, otherwise the attacker may perform
replay attacks. Besides, the load/store instructions for Top
register are special here, and only used in Setjmp/Longjmp.
These instructions are always followed by the checking, so
the attacker is not able to reuse these code to modify the Top
register without check. We think the most secure and ideal
solution is the last one, but it may lead to extra runtime over-
head since it use system calls. In our implementation, we use
the first way to protect the jump buffer in our prototype, in
this way, we could reuse the hash module. How to protect
the jump buffer is not the focus of this paper, the jump buffer
is a natural vulnerability since it can overwrite the registers
via memory. The above solutions provides satisfactory pro-
tection on Top register, however, our design will benefit from
any design that protect the context switching.
5 Analysis and Comparison on Designs
In this section, we will analysis Zipper Stack in terms of
security, performance and system complexity, and compare
them with other mechanisms.
5.1 Security Analysis
Now, we discuss the security of Zipper Stack. The challenge
for the attacker is clear: how to tamper with the memory to
make the fake return address be used and bypass our check?
We list the defence effect of different methods of protecting
return addresses in the face of different attackers in Table 1.
The table shows that Zipper Stack has higher security than
the Shadow Stack and other cryptography-based protection
mechanisms.
5.1.1 Direct Overwrite
First, we consider direct overwrite attacks. Here, the over-
write includes the stack overflow and arbitrary overwrite.
In the previous cryptography-based methods, the adversary
cannot know the key and calculate the correct hash value,
so it is secure. But we go further that the adversary may
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steal the key and can calculate the correct hash. As Figure 5
shows, in order to tamper with any return address structure
and bypass the check (let’s say, Return Address N), the at-
tacker must bypass the pre-use check. Even if the attacker
has stolen the key, the attacker needs to tamper with the hash
value which is used to check the return address, i.e. the hash
value stored beside Return Address N+1. Since the hash
value and the return address are protected by the hash al-
gorithm together, the attacker has to modify the hash value
stored beside Return Address N+2 in order to tamper with
the hash value bound to Return Address N+1. And so on,
the attacker has to modify the hash value at the top, which
is in the Top register. As we have assumed, the register is
secure against tampering. As a result, an overwrite attack
won’t work.
Figure 5. Direct Overwrite Attack: The solid lines indicate the
protect relation of the hash values, and the dotted lines show the
order that the attacker should overwrite in.
5.1.2 Replay Attack
Next, we discuss replay attacks: since we have assumed that
the attacker can read all the memory, can the attacker utilize
the protected addresses and their hash values in the mem-
ory to play a replay attack? In Zipper Stack it is not feasi-
ble, because once the call path has changed, the hash value
will be updated immediately. The hash values in an old call
path cannot work in a new call path, even if the address is
the same. This is an advantage over previous cryptography-
based methods: Zipper Stack can resist replay attacks natu-
rally.
5.1.3 Brute-force Attack
Then we discuss the security of Zipper Stack in the face of
brute force. Here we consider the attacks which read all re-
lated data in the memory, guess the secret constantly, and
finally construct the attack. In the cryptography-based ap-
proaches, security is closely related to the entropy of the se-
cret. Here in Zipper Stack, the entropy of the secret is the bit
width of Key register (Ns), which means the attacker needs
to guess the correct Key register in a space of 2Ns.
The difference between Zipper Stack and other
cryptography-based approaches is, since the ciphertex-
t/hashes can be tampered with in the memory, other
approaches will fail to protect control flow once the attacker
knows the secret, but Zipper Stack will not. Because even if
the attacker knows the value in Key register (secret key), the
Top register cannot be tampered with. If an attack contains
N gadgets, the attacker needs to find N hash collisions whose
input contains the ROP (or ret2lib) gadget addresses in order
to use the gadgets and bypass the check1. Considering an
ideal hash function, one collision will take about 2Nh−1 times
of guesses on average2. So an attack with N gadgets will
take N ∗ 2Nh−1 times of guesses on average even if the Key
register is leaked. The total number of guesses is (guessing
Key value and the collisions) 2Ns−1 +N ∗ 2Nh−1. And more
unfortunate for the attackers: under a certain probability
(1− (1− 1/e)N for an attack contains N gadgets), the valid
hash collision does not even exist. Take an attack contains
5 gadgets as example, the possibility that the hash collision
does not exist is around 90%, and the possibility grows as
the N grows.
5.2 Performance Analysis
In Zipper Stack, the performance overhead comes mainly
from two aspects: memory access and cryptographic calcu-
lations. Here we enumerate the comparison with Shadow
Stack and other Cryptographic-based mechanisms, as shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: Performance Overhead Source Comparison
Mechanism Memory R/W Calculation Overhead
Zipper Stack non-compressed Hash Value Hash (Parallel) Medium
Zipper Stack compressed None Hash (Parallel) Low
Shadow Stack Backup Address None Low
Hash & Check Hash Value Hash High
Memory Access. Zipper Stack requires no more memory ac-
cess than other algorithms3, and has the best locality, which
is important when cache is limited. In addition, in most cir-
cumstances, not all the bits of return addresses are used to
address the code. Consequently we can replace the leading
zeros with the hash value. In the remainder of this paper, we
1The same gadget addresses won’t share the same collision, because the
hash values bound to them differ.
2The hash function is a (Nh+Na)bit-to-Nhbit function, so choosing a
gadget address will determine Na bits of input, which means there are 2Nh
optional values. On average, there is one hash collision in the values, since
every 2Nh+Na/2Nh = 2Na inputs share the same hash value. Because of
our special algorithm, this is not a birthday attack nor an ordinary second
preimage attack, but a limited second preimage attack.
3Although Stack Guard seems require less memory access, but it protect
less return addresses. Considering ”memory access per protected address”
both methods equal.
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call this Compressed Structure. This design is used in previ-
ous methods, such as [31]. With the Compressed Structure,
there is no extra memory access.
Calculation. With hardware support, Zipper Stack also has
an advantage on the overhead of hash calculation compared
with other cryptography-based mechanisms. When a Call
instruction occurs, a hash value and return address (or an en-
crypted return address) need to be written to memory. Other
mechanisms have to wait for the calculation to be completed
before storing the result to memory. While in Zipper Stack,
the value storing to memory is already in the Top register,
and the the new hash value is calculated and stored into Top
register. So the calculation and the memory access can be
handled in parallel. Figure 6 is a schematic of how Zipper
Stack differs from other methods in processing hash values.
In our hardware implementation, we use compressed
structure. The hash is stored together with the return ad-
dress. So in most scenario, our new instruction consumes
only one cycle, like a nop. The evaluation also shows that
the hash calculation hardly hinders other operations and has
only a slight impact on runtime overhead. See Section 6.3.
Figure 6. Difference in Pipeline
5.3 System Complexity
In this section, we discuss how to use Zipper Stack in real
deployments, i.e., what changes need to be made to the com-
piler, the CPU, and the operating system. Additionally, we
compare the changes with them in Shadow Stack. We take
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) [21] for ex-
ample, which includes a formal shadow stack implementa-
tion. In CET, the shadow stack is protected from tampering
through the page table protections such that regular store in-
structions cannot modify the contents of the shadow stack.
To provide this protection the page table protections are ex-
tended to support an additional attribute for pages to mark
them as ”Shadow Stack” pages.
Page Attribute In CET, a new page attribute leads to adapta-
tion problems at all levels. Except for the hardware support
in CPU, kernel support is also needed to make use of the
attribute, and to insure the security of the protected pages.
In addition, the compiler also needs modifications, and re-
lated libraries should be re-compiled. Zipper Stack will not
encounter these problems since it does not need a new page
attribute.
CPU Both Zipper Stack and Shadow Stack need special reg-
isters (Top and Key in Zipper Stack vs Shadow Stack Point-
ers in CET), which require hardware modification. In Zipper
Stack, we need an arbitrary hash module (The good news is,
similar modules are generally present in modern CPUs, and
we can reuse them directly.); in Shadow Stacks, we need a
new page attribute support.
Compiler and OS In operating system, both methods need
an initialization before the beginning of each program. In
addition, these registers also need to be saved and restored
when the processes are switched. After initialization, the
two are similar, but Zipper Stack has a simpler initialization:
In Zipper Stack, the special registers should be initialized
as random numbers; while in Shadow Stacks, we have to
allocate a special memory space and initialized the Shadow
Stack Pointer.
To sum up, we think Zipper Stack requires less modifica-
tions on the whole system than Shadow Stack.
6 Implementation
In this section, we introduce our implementation. We mainly
talk about the hardware approach first. In hardware ap-
proach, we implemented a prototype of Zipper Stack by
modifying the Rocket Chip Generator [43] and customized
the RISC-V instruction set accordingly. We also added a
hash module, several registers and several instructions into
the core. Whereafter, we modified the tool chain including
the compiler and the library glibc. Besides, we implemented
a similar Shadow Stack for compare. At last, we introduce
the customized compiler approach (LLVM implementation)
and customized ISA approach (Qemu implementation).
6.1 Overview
In Rocket core, we added a Top register and a Key register,
which correspond to those designed in the algorithm. These
two registers cannot be loaded/stored via normal load/store
instructions. At the beginning of a program, the Key and Top
register are initialized by random values.
In RISC-V architecture, a CALL instruction will store the
next PC, i.e. return address, to the ra register, and a RET
instruction will read the address in the ra register and jump
to the address. Consequently two instructions were added in
our prototype: PAC (process after call), PBR (process before
return). As their name implies, they will perform as a Zipper
Stack’s CALL/RET together with a normal CALL/RET.
For the sake of simplicity, we use a compressed structure.
In RISC-V architecture, the return address in register ra, so
we put the return address and the hash value together into
ra. In the current Rocket core, only lower 40 bits are used
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to store the address. Therefore, we use the upper 24 bits to
hold the hash value. Correspondingly, our Top register is 24
bits. And our Key register is 64 bits.
Our new instructions will update a hash (PAC after a
CALL) or check and restore a hash (PBR before a RET).
When a PAC instruction is executed, the address in ra (only
lower 40 bits) along with the old hash in the Top register will
be hashed, the result (new hash) will be stored in Top reg-
ister. The old hash is stored to the higher 24 bits in the ra
register (the lower 40 bits remain unchanged). Correspond-
ingly, when a PBR instruction is executed, the ra register
(including the hashes and address) is hashed and compared
with the Top register. If the values match, the hash value in
ra (higher 24 bits) is restored into the Top register, and the
higher 24 bits in ra is restored to zero. If the values do not
match, an exception will be raised (which means an attack).
The following piece of assembly code shows how a function
is protected in Zipper Stack.
call fun
...
fun:
+ pac
... # function body
...
+ pbr
ret
6.2 Hash Module
Next, we added a hash module in the Rocket Core. Here,
we use Keccak [5] (the algorithm used by Secure Hash Al-
gorithm 3 (SHA-3)) as the hash function. In our hardware
implementation, the arguments of Keccak are as follows:
l = 4,r = 256,c= 144
The main difference between our implementation and
SHA-3 is that we use a smaller l: in SHA-3, l = 6. We made
this change because we think the capacity of Keccak state 4
in SHA-3 is a little wasteful here. And this change will also
slightly reduces the latency of each operation (the number of
absorb rounds is reduced from 24 to 20). This hash mod-
ule will take 20 cycles for one hash calculation normally and
it uses 793 LUTs and 432 flip flops. As a comparison, the
multiplier costs 1686 LUTs and 214 flip flops. So the hash
module incurs less area overhead than a multiplier. In fact,
for a CPU that already contains a hash module, we don’t
need extra area overhead.
6.3 Pipeline
The pipeline in Rocket Core is a 5-stage single-issue in-order
pipeline. In order to reduce possible performance losses,
4Term of Keccak algorithm.
Figure 7. Pipeline of PAC and PBR
the hash calculations are processed in parallel. If the next
instruction that uses a hash arrives after the previous hash
finished, the pipeline will not stall. Figure 7 is a pipeline
diagram of two instructions. In Figure 7, IF, ID, EX, MEM,
WB stand for fetch, decode, execute, memory and write back
stages. UD/CK stands for updating Top register/checking
hash values. As the figure shows, if the next PAC/PBR in-
struction arrives after the Hash calculation, only one extra
cycle is added to the pipeline, which is equivalent to insert-
ing a nop. It is worth noting that the WB stage in PAC/PBR
do not rely on the finish of UD/CK stage: in write back stage
it only write the ra register, and the value do not rely on the
current hash calculation. Fortunately, most functions require
more cycles than 20. So in most cases, the PAC/PBR instruc-
tion takes only one cycle. Only frequent calls and returns,
such as a small function which recurs itself, will significantly
increase the performance loss. In the next section, we tested
these quantitatively.
6.4 Customized Compiler
To make use of the new instructions, we also customized the
riscv-gcc. It is noteworthy that, if a function will not call any
function, ra register will not be spilled to the stack. So we
only add the new instructions when the ra register is saved
into/restored from the stack (rather than all calls and returns).
The modification on riscv-gcc is quite simple: Whenever we
store a return address onto the stack, we add a PAC instruc-
tion; whenever we pop a return address from the stack, we
add a PBR instruction. The following two pieces of assem-
bly code show how our compiler use the new instructions.
# Modified if with Spilling ra:
fun:
+ pac
sd ra , 8(sp) # save ra
... # function body
ld ra , 8(sp) # restore ra
+ pbr
ret
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# Not Modified if without Spilling ra:
fun:
... # function body
ret
6.5 Setjmp/Longjmp Support
To support Setjmp/Longjmp, we also modified the glibc in
the RISC-V tool chain. We have only modified two points:
1. Declaration of the Jump Buffer: Add additional space
for the Top register and Hash value.
2. Setjmp/Longjmp: Store/restore the Top register; Calcu-
late/check the Hash value.
Our changes perfectly support Setjmp/Longjmp, which is
verified in some benchmarks in SPEC2000, such as perlbmk.
These benchmarks will not pass without Setjmp/Longjmp
support.
6.6 Optimization
In order to further reduce the runtime overhead, we also
optimized the hash module. In our scenario, there are lots
of repeated calculations. So we added a small cache (with
a size of 4) to cache the recent hash results. If a new hash
request can be found in the cache, the hash calculation will
take only one cycle. This optimization slightly increased
the complexity of the hardware, but significantly reduced
runtime overhead. The cache incurs an area overhead of just
183 LUTs and 380 flip flops, while the runtime overhead is
reduced by around 30% (see Section 7).
Obviously, we made very few changes in the original hard-
ware, only a few registers and some logic modification for
new instructions are added. Furthermore, there is no increase
of the memory access.
6.7 A Comparable Hardware Based Shadow
Stack
In order to compare with Shadow Stacks, we also imple-
mented a hardware supported Shadow Stack on Rocket Core.
We tried to be consistent as much as possible: We added
two instructions that can back up or check the return address,
and a pointer pointing the shadow stack. The compiler with
Shadow Stacks inserts the instructions just like the way in
Zipper Stack. The exception support is also similar. At the
beginning of each program, we allocate a memory area to
place the shadow stack.
6.8 Other Implementations
To facilitate the evaluation of security and compatibility, we
also implemented Zipper Stack on Qemu [4]; To demonstrate
the potential of Zipper Stack in the compiler implementation
and with different bit width, we also implemented Zipper
Stack based on LLVM [24].
6.8.1 Qemu
We want to figure out if we change the logic of calls and
returns (into them in Zipper Stack), is it possible to use the
existing binaries without modification. In addition, in order
to demonstrate Zipper Stack’s security, we customized the
x86-64 instruction set, and used Qemu to simulate it. All the
simulation is in the User Mode of Qemu 2.7.0.
The modification is quite concise, we add two registers
and change the logic of Call and Ret instructions. As the
algorithm designed, the Call instruction will push the address
and the Top register, update the Top register with a new hash
value, while Ret instruction will pop the return address and
check the hash value. These can be achieved by modifying
the intermediate representation (IR) in Qemu.
Here, we use a compressed structure. Since Qemu uses
lower 39 bits to address the memory, we use the upper 25
bits to store the hash value. Correspondingly, the width of
the Top register is also 25 bits. The Key register here is 64
bits. Both of them should be initialized by random numbers.
We used SHA-3 as the hash function in this implementation.
Since we did not change the stack structure, this implemen-
tation has good binary compatibility. Therefore it could help
us to evaluate the security with real x86-64 attacks.
6.8.2 LLVM
Can we use the current x86-64 CPUs to perform Zipper
Stack with a modified compiler? The answer is Yes. We im-
plemented Zipper Stack algorithm based on LLVM 4.0 Func-
tion Pass. First we allocate two registers: we set the lower 64
bits of XMM15 as the Top register, and the XMM14 as the
Key register. We modified the backend of the LLVM so as to
forbid both registers to be used by anything else. At the be-
ginning of a program, the Key and Top register are initialized
by random numbers.
Next, our implementation leverages the AES-NI instruc-
tions [17] on the Inter x86-64 architecture to minimize the
performance impact of hash calculation. (In our experimen-
tal environment (Intel Core i7), accelerate instructions for
SHA are not supported, so we use AES-NI instead.) We use
the Key register as the round key of AES-NI, and use one
128-bit AES block as the hash input (64-bit address and 64-
bit hash). The 128-bit result is truncated into 64-bit in order
to fit our design.
In each function, we insert a prologue at the entry, and
an epilogue before the return. In the prologue, the old Top
register is saved onto stack, and updated to the new hash
value of the current return address and the old Top register
value. In the epilogue, the hash value in the stack and return
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address are hashed again and compared with the hash value
in the Top register. If it doesn’t match, an exception will be
raised. Just as we introduced before.
In Linux ABI, unfortunately, the XMM registers are
scratch registers, which means the shared libraries may al-
ter the value in the Top register and Key register. So we also
recompiled the shared libraries so as to keep them from us-
ing XMM14 and XMM15. However, this problem can be
circumvented by using r15/r14 instead, since these registers
are callee-save registers. The price is that performance loss
increases (because r15/r14 are more often used in most pro-
grams).
In this implementation, the memory access is equivalent to
that in the Shadow Stacks, but with better locality. Further-
more, we do not need to allocate new pages for a separate
stack, which means in the real world, Zipper Stack consumes
lower memory.
7 Evaluation
We evaluated Zipper Stack in two aspects: Runtime Perfor-
mance and Security. We evaluated the performance overhead
with the SPEC CPU 2000 on the FPGA board and the Dhry-
stone using RTL simulation. We also evaluated the perfor-
mance overhead with different hash latency, to explore the
impact of the hash latency on performance.
Besides, we also evaluate Zipper Stack in other aspects:
a)Does our solution to the Setjmp/Longjmp work? b) If
we only modify the Call and Ret instructions in the x86-
64 ISA, and use the compression structure to maintain the
stack layout, is it possible to maintain binary compatibility
directly? c) The estimated performance overhead of Zipper
Stack based on customized compiler (LLVM implementa-
tion).
7.1 Performance Overhead
7.1.1 SPEC CINT 2000
To evaluate the performance of Zipper Stack on RISC-V, we
instantiated it on the Xilinx Zynq VC707 evaluation board
and ran the SPEC CINT 2000 [18] benchmark suite (due to
the limited computing power of the Rocket Chip on FPGA,
we chose the SPEC 2000 instead of SPEC 2006). The OS
kernel is Linux 4.15.0 with support for the RISC-V archi-
tecture [1]. The hardware and GNU tool-chain are based
on freedom (commit cd9a525) [35]. All the benchmarks
are compiled with GCC version 7.2.0 and -O2 optimization
level. We ran each benchmark for 3 times.
Table 3 shows the results of Zipper Stack and Shadow
Stacks5. The result shows that without optimization, Zip-
5Due to the limited computing power of the Rocket Chip on FPGA, we
used reduced version of reference input in some benchmarks. Please refer
to Appendix A.
per Stack is slightly slower than Shadow Stacks (2.69% vs
2.36%); while with optimization (the cache), Zipper Stack
is much faster than Shadow Stacks (1.86% vs 2.36%). To
sum up, the runtime overhead of Zipper Stack is satisfactory
(1.86%).
7.1.2 Performance Overhead with Different Hash La-
tency
We also tested the runtime overhead of different hash mod-
ules with different cycles, in order to clarify the relationship
between the latency of hash operation and runtime overhead.
Since we use Keccak algorithm, so different hash modules
are 10/20/40/80 cycles, corresponding to 10-20 rounds of ab-
sorbing, and each round taking 1/2/4 cycles. A SHA-3 cal-
culation will take 24 cycles, so we also tested the overhead
of 24 cycles. The Figure 8 shows the results.
Figure 8. Overhead with Different Hash Modules
The results show that when the hash calculation is faster
than 30 cycles, the runtime overhead is quite low; but when
it is slower than 30 cycles, the overhead increases sharply
with the increase of the cycles of the hash module. We spec-
ulate that this rule is due to the average number of cycles
between adjacent two call/ret instructions. After one call/ret
(pac/pbr), the hash module is busy. If the next call/ret in-
struction comes before the hash module finishing the calcu-
lation, the pipeline will stall to wait for the calculation. So
the hash calculation cannot be handled in parallel if the hash
cannot finish before next call/ret comes, as a result, the over-
head is high. Otherwise, the runtime overhead is fairly low.
Besides, the results also show that our optimization ef-
fect is remarkable. Moreover, the higher the latency of the
hash module, the more significant the optimization effect. A
noteworthy piece of data is 24, 2.30%(Optimized). Which
means, if we use SHA-3 as the hash function, the perfor-
mance overhead is exactly 2.30%, since the SHA-3 will take
exactly 24 cycles in our implementation.
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Table 3: Result of SPEC 2000 on FPGA
Benchmark Baseline Shadow Stack Zipper Stack Zipper Stack (optimized)
164.gzip 10923.10 10961.65 ( 0.35% ) 10960.60 ( 0.34% ) 10948.88 ( 0.24% )
175.vpr 7442.48 7528.06 ( 1.15% ) 7490.49 ( 0.65% ) 7485.40 ( 0.58% )
176.gcc 8227.93 8318.83 ( 1.10% ) 8348.99 ( 1.47% ) 8317.34 ( 1.09% )
181.mcf 11128.67 11153.01 ( 0.22% ) 11183.31 ( 0.49% ) 11168.93 ( 0.36% )
186.crafty 10574.27 10942.89 ( 3.49% ) 10689.74 ( 1.09% ) 10692.53 ( 1.12% )
197.parser 8318.16 8577.67 ( 3.12% ) 8658.89 ( 4.10% ) 8544.72 ( 2.72% )
252.eon 14467.81 15111.99 ( 4.45% ) 15519.98 ( 7.27% ) 15040.26 ( 3.96% )
253.perlbmk 7058.96 7310.78 ( 3.57% ) 7388.20 ( 4.66% ) 7342.20 ( 4.01% )
254.gap 7728.56 7850.32 ( 1.58% ) 7926.10 ( 2.56% ) 7817.52 ( 1.15% )
255.vortex 13753.47 14738.06 ( 7.16% ) 14748.70 ( 7.24% ) 14644.70 ( 6.48% )
256.bzip2 6829.01 6893.50 ( 0.94% ) 6954.81 ( 1.84% ) 6865.27 ( 0.53% )
300.twolf 11904.25 12044.16 ( 1.18% ) 11974.22 ( 0.59% ) 11917.37 ( 0.11% )
Average 2.36% 2.69% 1.86%
7.1.3 Cycles per New Instruction
To evaluate the cycles per new instruction (i.e., how many
cycles does a pac/pbr instruction consume on average), we
also used an RTL simulation provided by Rocket Chip Gen-
erator. We chose the high-performance, cycle-accurate C++
simulator to run the benchmark Dhrystone [47].
Table 4: Dhrystone on RTL Simulation
Method Shadow Stack Zipper Stack
Performance Overhead 0.96% 0.60%
Retired INS Increment 4004 4004
Total Cycles Increment 8158 4592
Cycles per INS 2.04 1.15
After 10 runs, the Shadow Stack’s average runtime over-
head on Dhrystone is 0.96% and Zipper Stack’s average run-
time overhead is only 0.60%. In both methods, retired in-
structions increased by 4004, and the number of total cycles
increased by 8158 in Shadow Stack and by 4592 in Zipper
Stack. Which means, one instruction for Shadow Stack takes
2.04 cycles and one instruction for Zipper Stack takes only
1.15 cycles on average. Table 4 shows the comparisons.
This result shows that the performance overhead of Zipper
Stack with hardware support is fairly low. And it proves that
our inference in Section 6.3 is consistent with the actual sit-
uation: in most cases, a new instruction we added will take
only one cycle.
7.2 Security Evaluation
7.2.1 Attack Tests
We tested some vulnerabilities and the corresponding attacks
to evaluate the security of Zipper Stack. In these tests, we use
Qemu implementation, because most attacks are very sensi-
tive to the stack layout, a customized compiler (or just a com-
piler in different version) may lead to failures. Using Qemu
simulation can keep the stack layout unchanged, avoid the il-
lusion that the defense works which is actually because of the
stack layout changes. In other words, because of our good
binary compatibility on Qemu implementations, we can use
some attacks without modification to evaluate the security of
Zipper Stack.
We wrote a test suite contains 18 attacks and the corre-
sponding vulnerable programs. Since Zipper Stack protects
return addresses, each attack contains at least one exploit
on return addresses, including stack overflow, ROP gadget
or ret2lib gadget. The vulnerabilities include stack overflow
and heap overflow. We listed as many combinations as pos-
sible. All attacks are detected and stopped (all of them will
alter the hash value and cannot pass the check in the Return).
These tests show that Zipper Stack is reliable.
7.2.2 Entropy Analysis
In this subsection, we summarize and analyze the entropy in
various implementations and calculate their defensiveness in
the face of brute force. The calculation method has already
been deduced before (see Table 1). In Table 5, we list the
Nh, Ns and the average number of times that a brute-force
attack needs to try in each implementation. N represents the
number of gadgets in an attack.
Based on the calculation, the security of Zipper Stack is
satisfactory: the attacker need much more than 263 attempts,
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Table 5: Entropy Calculation
Platform Nh Ns Offline Tries
LLVM 64 128 2127 +N ∗263
Qemu 25 64 263 +N ∗224
RISC-V 24 64 263 +N ∗223
and the difficulty of the attacks increases sharply as the num-
ber of gadgets increases.
7.3 Other Results
7.3.1 Setjmp/Longjmp Support
In the SPEC CPU 2000, several benchmarks require setjm-
p/longjmp support, such as perlbmk. Based on our exper-
iments, without our support of setjmp/longjmp, the bench-
marks will fail. As long as the setjmp/longjmp is supported,
the benchmarks passed. This proves that the method we
mentioned in Section 4.3 perfectly supports setjmp/longjmp.
7.3.2 Compatibility Test
Here, we test the binary compatibility of Zipper Stack. It
should be noted that this test is only valid for Qemu imple-
mentation. In the other two implementations, due to we have
modified the compiler, we could use Zipper Stack as long as
we recompile the source code, so there is no compatibility
issue. The purpose of this test is: If we only modify the Call
and Ret instructions in the x86-64 ISA, and use the com-
pression structure to maintain the stack layout, is it possible
to maintain binary compatibility directly?
We chose randomly 50 programs in Ubuntu (under the
path /usr/bin) to test the compatibility in Qemu. 42 out of
50 programs are compatible to our mechanism. Most failures
are due to the Setjmp/Longjmp, which we have not supported
yet. So we think although there are some issues that need to
be solved (such as the setjmp/longjump), Zipper Stack can
be used directly on most existing x86-64 binaries.
7.3.3 Performance Evaluation in LLVM
To evaluate the performance of Zipper Stack on customized
compiler, we run the SPEC CPU 2006 [19] compiled by our
customized LLVM. It is worth noting that, the LLVM imple-
mentation use AES-NI instructions, not a stand hash algo-
rithm, so performance results are estimated6.
Table 6 shows the performance overhead of Zipper Stack
on LLVM7. Shadow Stack is reported to cost about 2.5-5%
[38, 12], and we also implemented a Shadow Stack in LLVM
6In our experiment environment (Intel Core i7), accelerate instructions
for SHA are not supported, so we use AES-NI instead. Accurate results
require the SHA acceleration instructions, which is not available now.
7The performance gain is due to fluctuations.
4.0 and run the SPEC CPU 2006 in the same way as Zip-
per Stack, which costs 3.09%. The performance overhead
of Zipper Stack is 2.48% on average, which is slightly faster
than Shadow Stack.
Table 6: Performance Overhead on LLVM
Benchmark Origin Shadow Stack Zipper Stack
401.bzip2 778.04s 789.13s (1.43%) 792.95s (1.92%)
429.mcf 372.85s 403.95s (8.34%) 393.71s (5.59%)
445.gobmk 562.39s 582.40s (3.56%) 583.15s (3.69%)
456.hmmer 1004.49s 1007.82s (0.33%) 988.10s (-1.63%)
458.sjeng 680.83s 700.11s (2.83%) 708.84s (4.11%)
462.libquantum 509.09s 511.58s (0.49%) 508.27s (-0.16%)
464.h264ref 932.75s 976.22s (4.66%) 968.38s (3.82%)
Average 3.09% 2.48%
8 Future Work and Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed Zipper Stack, a novel algorithm of
return address protection, which hashes all return addresses
by a chain structure. It minimizes the amount of state requir-
ing direct protection and costs very low performance over-
head.
Through our analysis, Zipper Stack is an ideal way to pro-
tect return addresses, and we think it is a better alternative to
Shadow Stack. We discussed various possible attackers and
attacks in detail, concluding that an attacker cannot bypass
Zipper Stack and then alter the return addresses. In most
cases, Zipper Stack is more secure than existing methods.
The simulation of attacks on Qemu also corroborates the se-
curity of Zipper Stack. Our experiment also evaluated the
runtime performance of Zipper Stack, and the results have
shown that the performance loss of Zipper Stack is very low.
The performance overhead with hardware support based on
Rocket Core is only 1.86% on average (versus a hardware
based Shadow Stack costs 2.36%). We also discussed the
changes that need to be made in the actual deployment, con-
cluding that the changes are simple enough. Thus, the pro-
posed design is suitable for actual deployment.
Zipper Stack also has the potential to be implemented with
different parameters on various platforms, and to keep bi-
nary compatibility with the existing programs using x86-64
instruction set. We will go further on it, apply Zipper Stack
more widely and make further optimizations.
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A Benchmark Size Reduction
Our evaluations takes over 30 runs of the whole SPEC 2000,
but one run will take over 60 hours, so the whole evaluation
will take several months. Consequently we used reduced ver-
sion of reference input in some benchmarks. We will intro-
duce how we reduced the benchmarks here.
Table 7: Benchmark Size Reduction
Benchmark Reduction
Original
Runtime
Reduced
Runtime
gzip
Reduce buffer size from
60MB to 30MB 6.0h 3.0h
vpr Run 1 task out of 2 tasks 4.3h 2.1h
gcc Run 3 tasks out of 5 tasks 4.3h 2.3h
mcf No Reduction 3.1h 3.1h
crafty No Reduction 2.9h 2.9h
parser
Reduce the input from
7760 lines to 3000 lines 5.7h 1.7h
eon Run 1 task out of 3 tasks 13.9h 4.0h
perlbmk Run 4 task out of 7 tasks 4.5h 2.0h
gap No Reduction 2.1h 2.1h
vortex No Reduction 3.8h 3.8h
bzip2
Reduce buffer size from
58MB to 30MB 3.8h 1.9h
twolf Slow 10 to 5 6.5h 3.3h
Total 61.1h 32.3h
For mcf, crafty, gap, vortex, the runtime is acceptable, so
we did not reduce the size of them. For gzip and bzip2,
we reduced the buffer size from 60MB/58MB to 30MB, the
runtime is reduced by about 50%. For vpr, gcc, eon and
perlbmk, we randomly chose a subset of the tasks. Parser
is a syntactic parser of English, we reduced the input from
7760 lines to the first 3000 lines. The twolf is used in the
process of creating the lithography artwork needed for the
production of microchips. In the parameter file of twolf, the
parameter ”slow” will affects the number of attempts in the
algorithm. We reduced the value of ”slow” from 10 to 5, so
the runtime reduced by around 50%.
We have reduced the runtime of some of the benchmarks,
but guaranteed that the runtime will not be too short (at least
around 2 hours). These reductions are completely fair and
will not cause bias.
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